1.  During the Autumn of 1990, UK forces deployed to the
          Arabian Gulf as part of a multi-national force in response  to
          Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait.  They faced a nation
          assessed to have extensive biological and chemical(1)  warfare
          capabilities.  Iraq was assessed to have stockpiled -  and
          possibly weaponised - anthrax and botulinum toxin  (BTx).
Intelligence subsequently acquired during the military  build-up
          suggested additionally a risk of the use of  plague.  Exposure
          to anthrax or plague leads to the early onset of respiratory
          disease, is debilitating and often fatal.  Exposure to BTx
          leads to rapid collapse and death unless effective treatment  is
          provided quickly.
         
          2.  In response to these possible threats, the Ministry of
          Defence placed a precautionary order for  anthrax vaccine in
          August 1990.  Anthrax vaccine was licensed in the  UK  and
          produced by the Public Health Laboratory Service (PHLS) at the
          Centre for Applied Microbiology and Research (CAMR).
          Ideally, 4 vaccinations were required to provide  maximum
          protection: an initial dose followed by doses at 3, 7 and 32
          weeks.  The degree of protection would increase after each
          dose, but research suggested that effectiveness would  be
          enhanced if anthrax vaccine was given together with an  adjuvant such as pertussis (whooping cough) vaccine.  It was recognised
          that in the immediate environment of a BW attack, where a  large
          number of anthrax spores would probably have been ingested,
          100% protection could not be guaranteed.  But it was assessed
          that vaccination coupled with post-attack treatment  with
          antibiotics should significantly reduce mortality.
  3.  A vaccine was known against BTx, but advice  from  potential
          suppliers in the US indicated that it would take many months  to
          acquire and 4 doses (at 0, 2, 12 and 36 weeks) to  confer
          immunity.  An alternative was to acquire  antitoxin  serum
          fractionated from the plasma of either humans or goats who had
          previously been vaccinated against BTx, for use as a post-
          attack treatment.  Production of human and animal  serum  against
          BTx was authorised in October 1990.
	  
         4.   Biological Antibiotic Treatment Sets (BATS) for post-
         attack use (following exposure to anthrax or plague)  were  also
         issued to the Gulf.  Medical units in theatre also  held  large
         additional stocks of antibiotics.
         
         5.   The Ministry of Defence authorised anthrax  vaccination  to
         commence in theatre from 2 January 1991.  All  vaccines  were  to
         be offered on the basis of voluntary informed consent.  This
         meant that the name and nature of the vaccine, the  reason  why
         it was being given, and any possible side-effects,  should  be
         described before inoculation.  Personnel were  free  to  refuse
         inoculation if they wished, but the possible  consequences  of
         doing--so (the infection with and possible death from a  serious
         disease) were to be made clear.  As for other inoculations
         given to military personnel on a voluntary basis, it  was  not
         necessary for personnel to sign a consent form.
	 
         6.   The pertussis vaccine used in the Gulf was  purchased  from
         France.  Although this product was produced and licensed  in  the
         UK, production capacity was insufficient to meet the
         requirement for the Gulf without disrupting the  Department  of
         Health child immunisation programme.  The  imported  vaccine  was
         tested and released by the National Institute of Biological
         Standards and Control (NIBSC).
	 
         7.  There was a difference of assessment between the US and the
         UK concerning plague.  The US decided not  to  vaccinate  against
         it. (It is likely that some US personnel deployed to  the  Gulf
         had previously been vaccinated against plague as part of
         routine vaccinations and were, therefore, already  immune.)  But
         based-on UK intelligence assessment, a  vaccination  programme
         against plague was initiated for British troops.  The first
         dose was to be administered together with,or  shortly  after,
         the second anthrax and pertussis doses, to take  advantage  of
         the pertussis adjuvant effect.
	 
         8.   Records suggest that there was a significantly lower take-
         up in theatre of the plague vaccination programme and the
         second  pertussis adjuvant.  Following administration of the
         first anthrax and pertussis inoculations, a  significant  number
         of personnel had developed short-term side-effects.
         Recollections of those in theatre at the time suggest  that  the
         take-up rate of plague vaccine in units belonging to  7  Brigade
         was low, whereas in units belonging to 4 Brigade it was higher.
         These differences reflected variations in local  medical  advice
         and operational considerations.  The latter were important
         since while troops were deploying forward it would have  had  a
         detrimental effect on operational capability if  a  significant
         number had been allowed to become temporarily  unwell.  (It  was
         considered likely by local medical staff that the plague ,
         vaccine would have caused unwelcome side-effects for up  to  48
         hours.)
	 
         9.   On 28 February 1991 hostilities in the Gulf were
         suspended.  The third  anthrax  and second plague inoculations
         were not administered to the  vast majority of personnel.
         10. Because of weaknesses  in  the system of medical  record-
         keeping during the Gulf War it  is now difficult or in some
         instances impossible to  determine which personnel received
         which vaccinations.  The  Ministry is considering ways of
         improving the system of medical record-keeping in any future
         conflict.
        
         11.  Stocks of BTx antitoxin serum (both human and goat) were
         sent to the Gulf.  Although neither form of the serum  had  a
         Medicines Act product licence, the NIBSC approved its use as a
         post-attack treatment on a named patient basis.  This meant
         that, should it be used, records would have to be kept of the
         names of personnel to whom it was administered.  As no BW
         agents were released during the Gulf conflict, the serum was
         never used.
         
         12.  Since the Gulf conflict, UNSCOM have attempted to uncover
         the extent of Iraq's BW programme up until July 1991.  By Iraq's
         own admission, large amounts of anthrax and BTx had been
         weaponised by the time of the Gulf  conflict.  Although  Iraq
         continues to deny the existence of plague in its BW inventory,
         UNSCOM do not believe that Iraq has yet fully  disclosed  the
         extent of its programme.
	 
        13. During the conflict, the Government  took  all  available
         steps to offer protection to its personnel.  In  doing  so  it
         drew on the best professional advice.  The Government's
         motivation was to maintain our  operational capability to
         confront the aggression of Saddam Hussein while, as far as
         possible, reducing the risks to our own personnel.  Although,
         as events turned out, BW weapons were not used in the conflict,
         no responsible Government could have ignored the clear assessed
         risk of such use.
	 
        (1)  The threat from chemical weapons was addressed by the use of Nerve
          Agent Pre-treatment Sets (NAPS) which were issued to personnel in the Gulf.
          These have been described elsewhere and are not addressed further in this
          memorandum.
There are some obvious errors in this memorandum and misleading facts, I will try to address them here along with descriptions of the diseases and threats. As far as I can I will offer links to text that backup the arguments I am presenting here.
 1. Anthrax, the the disease and the vaccine, details  of both can be found by following these links.
 2. Plague, information regarding both the disease and vaccine can be found by following this link, pay particular attention to the manufacturers recommendations for administration because we will return to this.
 3. So now we come to the role of pertussis as an adjuvant for anthrax and, as it seems from above, plague as well. We have read from the above " but research suggested that effectiveness would  be ", I offer this link  to a short passage regarding the use of pertussis in this role. You will see that the article was published in August '91 a full 7 months after this combination was administered, TWICE! Would it be unreasonable to suggest that this cocktail was experimental?
 4. Voluntary informed consent is the subject here. Well as we have just established that pertussis/anthrax was somewhat experimental, does that mean that informed consent was required here, read the words and make up your own mind !
 5. So, there was a difference of opinion and the US decided not to vaccinate with plague, well you had better read this extract from GulfLINK, (see table 1.) so did the US use plague, I think yes. Both the DoD and the US vets confirm this.
 6. The anthrax, pertussis  and plague should be administered as closely as possible to each other, doesn't the MoD read the manufacturers instructions for use "Plague Vaccine should not be given on the same occasion as typhoid or cholera vaccines". There is additional comment made about this by the manufacturer (see letter of 16 May '94):
"Anthrax pertussis (whooping cough) and Yersinia pestis (plague) are all bacterial vaccines, each of which cause similar side effects and if given together, can cause additive reactions. If given together, one should expect a high rate of systemic reactions, such as malaise, muscle soreness, headache and possible fever. Giving the vaccines in different arms or muscles may be helpful in minimizing local reactions at the injection site, but the systemic reactions will likely be the same. It is a medical decision as to whether the expected higher rate of reactions are acceptable to achieve earlier vaccination protection than could be gained by staggering the vaccinations further apart."
 7. Finally we address the question of "named patient basis". This should have been used in 2 of the situations: 1. Plague vaccine, licensed in the US and Canada, but not the UK, see what the  manufacturer (see letter of 11 Aug '94 para 4) has to say about this. 2. NAPS, these were unlicensed for the manner in which they were used at the time of administration, so doesnt named patient basis come into play here as well.
 
 
 
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